The Jurisdiction of Courts (Part 3) by Gavit, Bernard C.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 11 | Issue 6 Article 3
8-1936
The Jurisdiction of Courts (Part 3)
Bernard C. Gavit
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gavit, Bernard C. (1936) "The Jurisdiction of Courts (Part 3)," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 11: Iss. 6, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol11/iss6/3
JURISDICTION OF COURTS
By BERNARD C. GAVIT*
(Continued from June Journal)
VI.
One of the corollaries of the doctrine of the separation of
powers is the proposition that the legislature may not deprive
the courts of judicial jurisdiction. The legislative action here
in general takes two forms. The first deals directly or in-
directly with judicial jurisdiction as such. The second directly
or indirectly seeks to delegate to or impose upon a non-
judicial person or tribunal judicial power.
In the first instance the situation is complicated by the fact
that constitutions commonly provide for the establishment of
designated courts but often add that they are constitued "with
such jurisdiction as the legislature may prescribe." Constitu-
tions also frequently expressly grant to the legislature power
to establish additional courts. 189 Other constitutions leave the
establishment of courts to the legislature in rather broad
terms.
If a constitution expressly or by fair implication limits the
jurisdiction of a designated court or if it grants it exclusive
jurisdiction over a given subject-matter the legislature obvi-
ously cannot enlarge or limit the jurisdiction of such a court
nor delegate that jurisdiction to another court.190 It is fre-
*Dean of the Indiana University School of Law. This is the third and con-
cluding part of this article. Parts one and two appeared in the April and
June issues.
189 The federal Constitution (Art. III) is a fair sample.
190 See, e. g., State ex rel Griswold v. Lea, 211 Ala. 68, 99 So. 170 (1924)
Hart v. Wimberly, 173 Ark. 1083, 296 S. W. 39 (1927); State ex rel by Cham-
bers, Controller, v. Royal Consol. Min. Co., 187 Cal. 343, 202 P. 133 (1921);
In re Sutter-Butte By Pass Assess., 190 Cal. 532, 213 P. 974 (1923); In re
Brown's Est., 65 Colo. 341, 176 P. 477 (1918); Greeley Transp. Co. v. People,
79 Colo. 307, 245 P. 720 (1926); Dexter Yarn Co. v. American Fabrics Co., 102
Conn. 529, 129 A. 527 (1925); American Ry. Exp. v. Weatherford, 86 Fla.
524
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quently held that the creation by the constitution of a court
with a specific grant of power to it is by fair implication a
constitutional grant of exclusive or limited power in that
field. 19 1 This has been held to be true even although the
constitution also provides that the legislature may "regulate
and restrict" the court's jurisdiction thus granted.19 2 Prob-
ably it is a fair interpretation of that or a similar phrase that
it gives no authority to delegate jurisdiction to another court;
delegation is not regulation. But in general it is a fair inter-
pretation of most constitutional provisions on the subject of
courts (apart from specific courts of final review) that the
626, 98 So. 820 (1924); Boswell v. Roberts, 157 Ga. 585, 122 S. E. 216, 651
(1924); Ex parte France, 176 Ind. 72, 95 N. E. 515 (1911); State v. Wilson,
30 Kan. 661, 2 P. 828 (1883); Reiser v. Ward, 193 Ky. 368, 236 S. W. 255
(1922); Perez v. Cognevich, 156 La. 331, 100 So. 444 (1924); City of New
Orleans v. Riisse, 164 La. 369, 113 So. 879 (1927); Mailman v. Record F. & M.
Co., 118 Me. 172, 106 A. 606 (1919); Attorney General v. Lacy, 180 Mich.
329, 146 S. W. 871 (1911); Lading v. City of Duluth, 153 Minn. 464, 190 N. W.
981 (1922) ; Robertson v. So. Bitulithic Co., 129 Miss. 453, 92 So. 580 (1922) ;
In re Letcher, 269 Mo. 140, 190 S. W. 19 (1916); State ex rel Barrett, Atty.
Gen. v. May, 290 Mo. 302, 235 S. W. 124 (1921); State ex rel. v. Locker, 266
Mo. 384, 181 S. W. 1001 (1915); Redmond v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R., 225 Mo.
721, 126 S. W. 159 (1910); Burnham v. Bennison, 121 Nebr. 291, 236 N. W.
745 (1931); Ex parte Thompson, 85 N. J. Eq. 221, 96 A. 102 (1915); In re
Walker's Est., 95 N. J. Eq. 619, 123 A. 423 (1924); Chas. W. Sommer & Bro.
v. Albert Lorsch & Co., 2541 N. Y. 16, 172 N. E. 271 (1930); Cincinnati Poly-
clinic v. Balch, 92 Oh. St. 415, 111 N. E. 159 (1915) ; Wagner v. Armstrong,
93 Oh. St. 443, 113 N. E. 397 (1916) ; In re Hawke, 107 Oh. St. 341, 140 N. E.
583 (1923); Commonwealth Oil Co. v. Turk, 118 Oh. St. 273, 160 N. E. 856
(1928) ; Strickland v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 112 S. C. 67, 98 S. E. 853 (1919);
Winner Mill Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 43 S. D. 574, 181 N. W. 195 (1921) ;
Clements v. Roberts, 144 Tenn. 152, 231 S. W. 902 (1921) ; Panama R. v. John-
son, 264 U. S. 375 (1924) ; Cf: State v. Aiello et al., 317 I1. 159, 147 N. E. 916
(1925); City of Detroit v. Dingeman, 233 Mich. 356, 206 N. W. 582 (1926);
People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601,
16 A. L. R. 152 (1921); State ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 36 Utah 68,
104 P. 750 (1909).
191 Most of the cases cited supra n. 190 fall in this category. They involve
usually courts of review.
192 See, e. g., Tayler v. Stovall, 155 Ga. 894, 118 S. E. 715 (1923) ; Ex Parte
France, 176 Ind. 72, 95 N. E. 515 (1911); Winston & Co. v. Georgia & F. R.,
34 F. (2d) 163 (D. C. S. C. 1929). Cf.: State v. Aiello et al., 317 Ill. 159, 147
N. E. 916 (1925); State v. LeBlond, 108 Oh. St. 41, 140 N. E. 491 (1923);
DeSilva v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 499, 267 S. W. 271 (1924).
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constitution is providing for a court system, and therefore a
constitutional mention of "circuit" or "district" courts is not
an exclusive grant of all trial jurisdiction to such courts. 193
But assuming a grant of exclusive jurisdiction it would seem
to make no difference whether or not the legislative attack on
such exclusively granted constitutional jurisdiction was direct
or indirect. Thus there is authority for the proposition that
the legislature cannot without limit change equity law into
common law, and thereby deprive equity courts of their juris-
diction, 9 4 nor can Congress change Admiralty law into com-
mon law and deprive the Admiralty courts of their jurisdic-
tion. 195 The doctrine is not without its jester, for common
law courts and the legislature have frequently created sub-
stantive common law rights similar to recognized equitable
rights and thus assumed or created a "concurrent jurisdiction,"
193 A great many cases sustain the creation by the legislature of additional
and special courts or a reasonable distribution of jurisdiction as between courts.
See, e. g., McCreless v. Tenn. Valley Bk., 208 Ala. 414, 94 So. 722 (1922);
Grassy Slough Drainage Dist. v. Nat]. Box Co., 111 Ark. 144, 163 S. W. 512
(1914); Freitag v. Union Stock Y. & T. Co., 262 Ill. 551, 104 N. E. 901, 180
Ill. App. 268 (1914); White v. City of Ottawa et al., 318 Ill. 463, 149 N. E.
521 (1925) ; Mosley v. Board of Comrs., 200 Ind. 515, 165 N. E. 241 (1929);
State ex rel. Court of Industrial Relations et al. v. Howat, 107 Kan. 423, 191
P. 585 (1920), 109 Kan. 376, 198 P. 686, 25 A. L. R. 1210 (1921) ; Ashley v.
Wait, 228 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 961, 8 A. L. R. 1463 (1917); Bacot v. Board of
Suprs., 124 Miss. 231, 86 So. 765 (1921) ; Inhabitants of Palmyra Tp. v. Penn.
R., 62 N. J. Eq. 601, 50 A. 369; Affd. 63 N. J. Eq. 799, 52 A. 1132 (1902);
First Natl. Bk. v. Dunbar, 32 N. M. 419, 258 P. 817 (1927) ; State ex rel. Forch-
heimer v. LeBlond et al., 108 Oh. St. 41, 140 N. E. 491 (1923); El Reno W. G.
Co. v. Taylor, 87 Okla. 140, 209 P. 749 (1922); Strickland v. Seaboard A. L.
Ry., 112 S. C. 67, 98 S. E. 853 (1919) ; Sharpe v. Robertson, 5 Grat. (Va.) 518
(1849) ; State v. England, 86 W. Va. 508, 103 S. E. 400 (1920) ; Crane, Admr.
of Sauer, v. Hahlo et al., 258 U. S. 142 (1920); The Gansfjord, 25 F. (Ed.)
736 (D. C. La. 1928); Cf.: State ex rel Barrett, Atty. Gen. v. May, 290 Mo.
302, 235 S. W. 124 (1921).
194 In re Annexation of Fairbanks, 6 Alaska, 439 (1921); Brown v. Kala-
mazoo Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 274, 42 N. W. 827, 5 L. R. A. 226, 13 A. S. K_
438 (1889) ; Brady v. Carteret Realty Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 904, 67 A. 606 (1907).
Cf.: Lee v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 101 Mich. 406, 59 N. W. 644 (1894).
A great many cases concede some power here if the change simply "gives an
additional remedy" and thus creates a concurrent jurisdiction.
195 Panama R. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1924) ; Farrel v. Waterman S. S.
Co., 286 F. 284, 291 F. 604 (D. C. Ala. 1922).
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which is necessarily a denial of an exclusive jurisdiction. It
was held in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson196 that Congress
might create a "concurrent jurisdiction" in the common law
courts as to subject-matter which had previously been exclu-
sively within Admiralty jurisdiction. The court denied that
this invaded the Admiralty jurisdiction created by the Consti-
tution, saying that it did not deprive courts of jurisdiction,
it simply gave an alternative "permissive" remedy. The sub-
stance of the result of course is that the Admiralty jurisdiction
of the Federal courts has been construed not to be exclusive.
The fact that a constitution gives the legislature power to
create additional courts, or specific power to "regulate and
restrict" the jurisdiction of constitutional courts in final an-
alysis adds little if anything to the legislature's power in this
connection.
Provisions of that character must be (and in fact have
been) read in the light of the express or implied doctrine of
the separation of powers, and also of the doctrine of the
supremacy of the courts. It is an essential corollary of those
doctrines that the courts be entirely free from any legislative
restriction which directly or indirectly hampers a complete
and independent judicial system. The only reasonable inter-
pretation of a constitutional grant to the legislature of power
over judicial jurisdiction in the light of those two doctrines is
that the legislature may, as between courts (where there is
no exclusive constitutional grant to a designated court in-
volved) divide judicial jurisdiction in a reasonable manner.
It may also regulate and restrict the exercise of judicial juris-
diction within reason. Ultimately, however, there must be a
complete system of courts, free to exercise all judicial power,
without unreasonable regulation or restriction. Nothing less
than the latter satisfies the paramount doctrine of judicial
supremacy. Until that latter doctrine is repudiated or modi-
fied the cases cited above 197 rest on an accepted basis, even
19 4 Supra, N. 195.
197 Supra, N. 190-192.
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although in a given case it may be possible to quarrel success-
fully with the application of the doctrine.
Regulations or restrictions which are not unreasonable and
which do not invade the field of judicial jurisdiction as such
but which deal with its exercise are thus properly sustained. 198
In this connection, however, the courts themselves have in-
clined to error. They have failed to distinguish between the
concept of judicial jurisdiction as such, and the concept of the
regulation of its exercise. If we accept the doctrines described
immediately above it is obvious that the usual trial court has
all of the judicial jurisdiction possible as a matter of constitu-
tional law. At least jurisdiction of the subject-matter in any
event, even although it be in the first instance from a legis-
lative act, is simply an allocation of jurisdiction. The latter
necessarily rests on the Constitution, it is not created by the
legislature. The latter can create no judicial jurisdiction.
The doctrines of the separation of powers and the supremacy
of the courts constitute a constitutional creation of all the
judicial jurisdiction there can be. Thus legislation in this field
apart from that dealing directly with the allocation of juris-
diction as such, and the dividing line between courts, is legis-
lation regulating the exercise of judicial jurisdiction19 9 If
accepted in that light such legislation could always be con-
strued to be directory and not mandatory. A violation of such
legislative rules could well be said not to destroy jurisdiction.
If a court, acting judicially, having jurisdiction of the subject-
198 See, e. g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U. S. 506 (1868) ; Ex parte Harker, 49
Cal. 465 (1875); Sacramento & S. J. Drain. Dist. v. Superior Court, 196 Cal.
414, 238 P. 687 (1925); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 289 Ill. 608, 124 N. E. 562
(1919) ; Lake Erie & W. Ry. v. Watkins, 157 Ind. 600, 62 N. E. 443 (1902);
In re Petitions To Transfer, 202 Ind. 365, 174 N. E. 812 (1931) ; Thompson v.
Redington, 92 Oh. St. 101, 110 N. E. 652 (1915); Dempsey v. Reisler, 173 Wis.
296, 181 N. W. 218 (1921). Many additional cases expressly or by implication
sustain this proposition. Cf.: Wine v. Jones, 183 Ia. 1166, 162 N. W. 196, 168
N. W. 318 (1918).
199 The Declaratory Judgment Acts, for example, may be sustained not as
a grant of judicial jurisdiction but as a legislative regulation on the exercise
of jurisdiction. The author has enlarged upon the point in a previous article.
See, Procedure Under The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, 8 Ind. L. J.
409 (1933).
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matter, actually exercises judicial jurisdiction the fact that
there was some infraction of legislative rules on the subject
of its exercise of jurisdiction could be said to be erroneous
but not jurisdictional.
But courts have been fond of describing such legislative re-
quirements as conditions precedent to jurisdiction of the
subject-matter. Thus they have held that the issuance of
process is a condition precedent to jurisdiction of the subject-
matter.2 0 0  Statutory requirements as to the allegations in a
complaint 201 and other procedural requirements have met the
same fate. This has been particularly true in the field of
appellate practice.2 0 2  Procedural defects thus assume juris-
dictional proportions. Two principal reasons are suggested
by way of explanation. Courts have been misled by the com-
mon law analogies which are now wholly inapplicable.203
Courts, and particularly appellate courts, have reduced the
burden of their labors by this indirection.
The implications of the underlying theory have have far-
reaching consequences in what we call the law of judgments
and they are discussed later. It can fairly be said, however,
that a re-examination and thorough analysis of this field will
result in some saner results, particularly in the law of col-
lateral attack and foreign judgments. It is indeed a rather
unusual situation where it can be said properly that a judg-
ment was rendered without jurisdiction. The court may have
violated some rule as to the exercise of its jurisdiction, but
that is erroneous and not jurisdictional.
The question of the delegation of judicial pocer to a
tribunal other than a court or judge is raised in a number of
situations. The solution of the problem must start with the
200 See, e. g., Friebe v. Elder 181 Ind. 597, 105 N. E. 151 (1914) ; Ramsde!l
v. Duxberry, 14 S. D. 222, 85 N. W. 221 (1901).
201 See, e. y., Holton v. Holton, 64 Ore. 290, 129 P. 532 (1913) and note
48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 779.
202 Nothing is worse settled than the proposition that practically every step
in appellate procedure is jurisdictional. An appellate court may occasionally
break down and hold that a procedural defect is immaterial but such decisions
are very rare.
203 See supra, pp. -.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
concept of judicial organization. If the tribunal or officer in
a given case is a court or a judge then the problem presented
is not one of delegation but is one of the allocation of judicial
power. But in order to avoid the implications of both propo-
sitions the courts have not hesitated to describe the tribunal in
question as "administrative" or "quasi-judicial" and therefore
not "judicial." The tribunal and its personnel therefore fall
within the executive or legislative department, and the final
problem is whether or not judicial power has been delegated
to it.
The cases are somewhat indefinite as to what the concept
of a "court" is. It is of course clear that when constitutions,
legislation and judicial decision talk about a "judge" and a
"court" they are talking in terms of legal concepts and not the
physical background. A person is a "judge" simply because he
has been elected or appointed to that office. He acts judicially
when he attempts to perform the duties of the office. A
"court" likewise is a "court" because by constitutional and
legislative authority it has been so incorporated. It is a legal
entity quite apart from its physical paraphernalia and its per-
sonnel. The "judge" is but an element. Usually judicial
action is action by the "court", although of course the judge,
the clerk and other officers direct its action.20 4
It does seem clear that we conceive of judicial power being
exercised by a legal entity called a "court". Due to the law of
terms of courts and vacation it is necessary sometimes to as-
cribe judicial action to the judge rather than the court because
during vacation there is no "court". 20°  Whenever we repudi-
ate the idea of terms and vacations 20 6 there will be no necessity
for that distinction and all judicial action will be performed by
the "court".
The dividing line between a "court" and a tribunal or officer
in the executive department starts necessarily with constitu-
204 See, e. g., Thompson v. Dillingham, 183 N. C. 566, 112 S. E. 321 (1922).
See also the cases cited in 33 C. J., p. 960, n. 80-85.
205 Statutes frequently provide that the "judge" may grant injunctions, ap-
point receivers and take care of other emergency matters during vacation.
They preserve, in form, the idea that during vacation there is no "court."
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tional provisions on the subject. In so far as they are exclusive
courts and judges thereby provided for are beyond legislative
control. Certainly if a constitution, for example, provides
that the judges of the supreme court shall be elected legisla-
tion providing for their appointment would be invalid. Leg-
islation could not properly provide for the exercise of any of
the judicial powers of a trial judge, whose office is provided
for in a constitution, by one not selected as provided by the
constitution. 207
The jury, of course, in certain types of cases is a part of the
"court". It acts judicially. But there is authority for the
proposition that even so legislation may not delegate to the
jury the decision of questions of fact in an equity case where
the verdict is anything more than advisory. 208
But in the absence of express constitutional prohibition
courts and judges may be established and selected according to
legislative standards, if there is no invasion of an exclusive
constitutional jurisdiction in an existing court. 209
Additional legislative courts as a matter of fact are fre-
quently established where jurisdiction is concurrent with or
supplementary to that of existing judicial tribunals. 210  This
206 The idea is, of course, copied from the English system which was moti-
vated by religious reasons. Courts adjourned for the religious feasts. There is
no present validity to those results. The only practical result is that a judg-
ment becomes "final" on the termination of the term. When terms are abol-
ished provision will have to be made to take care of that situation.
207 See, e. g., Shoultz v. McPheeters, 79 Ind. 373 (1881); Van Slyke v.
Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 390, 20 Am. Rep. 50 (1876); and note
25 Am. Rep. 540. Thus in the absence of constitutional authority special judges
must be chosen from those already regularly constituted as judicial officers. The
Indiana case cited above is subject to the criticism that the Indiana Constitu-
tion (Art. VII, Sec. 10) expressly gives the legislature power to provide for
special judges, and the act in question might well have been sustained on that
theory.
208 See, e. g., Brown v. Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 274 (1889). Cf.: Berry v.
St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 223 Mo. 358. 122 S. W. 1043 (1909).
209 See supra, n. 193. A great many cases sustain this proposition. In most
instances the result is obvious.
210 For a thorough treatment of the situation in the Federal system see,
Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894 (1930). The Federal
situation is not essentially different from the normal state situation.
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is particularly true if legislation makes notable changes in the
substantive law upon a given subject and a tribunal is created
to deal with the new law thus established.
It is more or less obvious that in almost any instance the
legislature could create a court rather than an administrative
tribunal to deal with some of the problems so often delegated
to the latter.
It is not the purpose here to attempt a complete statement
on the subject of administrative law. Only in so far as it
presents a problem in the field of the jurisdiction of courts it
is a pertinent inquiry at this point. However it may be worth
while to point out that there has been some unnecessary em-
phasis on the subject. It develops that those who discovered
"Administrative Law" and who would exploit it are simply
dealing with some old law under a new name. We have al-
ways had a law of "Public Officers." "Administrative Law"
is composed of three major divisions. The first is one of
statutory interpretation. The problem there is, what author-
ity has a statute given an officer? The technic seems to be no
different from that in any other field. The second is the one
of the tort (legal or equitable) liability of the public officer
who exceeds his authority thus granted. The third is the one
of the constitutional validity of the statute giving administra-
tive authority. To the casual observer there has been little
significant development here during the past two decades. It
is true that the volume has increased. But the volume of all
law in action and law in litigation has increased. But cer-
tainly; there has been no change in the constitutional law on
the subject. The change in tort liability has been impercep-
tible; the administrative officer who exceeds his authority is
liable even although he acted in good faith; he has none or
little of the immunity of judicial officers. The change in statu-
tory interpretation is slight. Apparently courts have been
a little more liberal in construing legislation in this field in
favor of the officer; he has more "discretion", that is a wider
grant of power than he had under earlier decisions. But the
problem is still one of a fair statutory interpretation. The
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rules seem no different than in the balance of the field of
statutory interpretation.
The essential problem is the one of legislative policy at the
beginning: ought administrative responsibility to be placed
primarily on the executive or the courts? It can be demon-
strated that the legislature, as a matter of constitutional law,
has the power to put it in either field. The decision should be
on the merits, and probably in most instances has been on the
merits. Thus lawyers who lament the practical invasion of
the judicial field by administrative tribunals would do well to
abandon the repeated and unsuccessful attacks on constitu-
tional grounds and accept the proposition that a disinterested
tribunal (the legislature) has determined in almost every
instance possible that administrative tribunals are preferable
to courts. Until the latter are modernized and lawyers meet
the problem squarely the decision will continue to be against
them.
The problem of the limits of the law of self-help is ever
with us. It lies within the field of legislative power because it
is expressed in terms of substantive rights. What are the con-
ditions precedent to the ultimate enforcement of legal inter-
ests? To what extent are one's personal and property in-
terests protected against the private enforcement of the rights
of others? Some of the law of self-help is still with us. One
is privileged under some circumstances to re-capture his goods,
and to protect his person and property without seeking first a
recognition of his legal interests from an executive or judicial
tribunal. It is a curious fact that to some extent at least the
law gives the individual the privilege of making an honest and
reasonable mistake in invading the rights of others in this con-
nection, whereas the law still is that an administrative officer
who makes an honest and reasonable mistake usually is liable
for invasion of the rights of others. The law still deals with
unnecessary harshness with the mistakes of administrative
officers. The contrast with the complete immunity afforded
judicial officers is too extreme, although it gives point to the
fact that the law here is judge made. The judges have abso-
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lute faith in their own integrity but little or none in that of
others.
In most instances, however, there is a rather complete
abolition of the law of self-help. One's rights against another
can only finally be enforced after a judicial or administrative
recognition of them. The requirements have varied. In some
states, for example, a mortgage may only be foreclosed
through the means of a judicial proceeding and sale. In some
states the foreclosure and sale are through an administrative
officer. In others a sale by the mortgagee himself is a proper
procedure. Workmen's compensation law, too, for example,
has been variously administered.
While many attacks have been made upon those, and sim-
ilar situations, it must be taken as settled that (apart from
the added implication of the constitutional privilege as to a
jury trial211 ) the doctrine of the separation of powers does not
prohibit legislation prescribing an administrative rather than
a judicial recognition of legal interests as a condition precedent
to their ultimate enforcement by the executive. That result
after all seems obvious. The recognition of rights as a step
in their enforcement, whether disputed or not, has never been
exclusively a judicial function.
Indeed as has been pointed out above2 2 the executive in-
evitably decides controversies, and determines facts and legal
interests whenever he acts in the discharge of his duties.
Whether he, or other persons, should be compelled to consult
a judicial tribunal before actual enforcement is available is a
matter of policy upon which the legislature has been accorded
almost unlimited power.
But the constitutional doctrine here which gives the execu-
tive and the legislature pause is the doctrine of the supremacy
of the courts. The executive or administrative officer must de-
cide correctly; he has no power to make a mistake. Whether
211 There is of course some authority for the proposition that this right may
not be impaired by the indirection of creating statutory rights and new reme-
dies and tribunals. See, e. g., United States v. Cunningham, 37 F. (2d) 349
(D. C. Nebr., 1929).
212 Supra, pp. -.
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he has or has not made a mistake is exclusively within the
judicial function.2 13  The executive 214 may not assume that
function, nor may the legislature give it to him.
It is inadvisable to attempt a review of all of the authority
upon this proposition. The cases of course are not without
confusion. But it is submitted that the controlling authority is
clear and decisive on the point. The land marks among the
cases are the Ben Avon Borough case215 and the case of
Crowell v. Benson.2 18  The first case decided that due process
of law required that the courts of a state be given power to
review the decision of an administrative tribunal on the merits,
both fact and law. Probably the results of that case are
questionable, for it has since been held that the absence of an
express provision for such a review is immaterial because un-
der the doctrine of the supremacy of the courts the courts have
the power of independent review in any appropriate action.2 17
Innumerable cases exist where the courts have insisted upon
such a review. 218
213After all this doctrine of the supremacy of the courts is judicial doc-
trine. It really rests on the lawyers' and judges' belief in their own superiority.
In any system of government one finds someone with final power. In some
countries it is the executive, in others it is the legislative and only in the
United States, or countries which have copied our system, it is the judiciary.
The, courts have seized the power on the theory that if anyone is to be given
final power it should be the courts. See, Potter, Judicial Power in The United
States, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 167, 285 (1928); Willis, The Doctrine of The Su-
premacy of The Supreme Court, 6 Ind. L. J. 224 (1931).
214 Including in this word administrative officers.
215 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 .(1920). See
also note 34 Col. L. Rev. 332 (1934) and authorities there cited.
216 285 U. S. 22 (1932). See also, Brown, Administrative Commissions and
The Judicial Power, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 261 (1935) and articles and authorities
there cited.
217 Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs., 278 U. S. 24
(1928).
218 The situation after all is no different from any other case where the
contention is that the legislature or the executive has exceeded its constitutional
authority. When such a case is properly presented to the courts the doctrine of
the supremacy of the courts requires a review on the merits. Otherwise by a
simple misstatement of the facts the court review would become meaningless.
One of the most effective illustrations is that where the United States Supreme
Court reviews a state court decision under the Federal Employers Liability
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The case of Crowell v. Benson is but a reiteration of estab-
lished doctrine. In it the emphasis was laid upon the doctrine
of the supremacy of the courts and not upon the due process
clause. It recognizes again the proposition that to give an
administrative tribunal power to decide fact or law erro-
neously would invade the judicial function. Despite the dis-
senting opinion in this case 219 it is submitted that that result
is accepted doctrine and that an opposite decision would be a
repudiation of the doctrine of the supremacy of the courts.
The argument in the minority opinion is quite inconclusive. It
rests substantially on the proposition that courts had accepted
administrative decisions as at least prima facie correct. But
courts have always, through a jury, a master, or a referee,
delegated, especially in technical cases, the preliminary survey
of the facts and accepted the decision as prima facie correct.
No reason exists why the rule should not be extended. That is
not at variance with the major proposition which precludes
the legislative or executive branch of the government from
finally deciding legal interests in controverted cases, or of
creating a jurisdiction which does not exist by the simple ex-
pedient of mis-stating the facts. 220
Other procedural problems here are beside the principal
point. On the whole, however, it seems properly within the
province of the legislature to prescribe the procedure for the
judicial review, provided it is adequate.2 2 1
Act. If the latter properly finds that the employee was engaged in intrastate
commerce it properly applies the state law to the case. But if the employee
was actually engaged in interstate commerce, regardless of state action, the
state law can properly (as a matter of jurisdiction and constitutional law)
have no application. Thus in such cases the United States Supreme Court has
insisted on a trial de no'o on that issue on review. See, Gavis, The Commerce
Clause of The United States Constitution (1932), Sec. 16, 76.
219 Per Brandeis, J., concurred in by Stone and Roberts, JJ.
220 The author is not defending the doctrine of the Supremacy of the
Courts. Its validity is a debatable question, for its acceptance is in one sense
undemocratic. So long, however, as it is accepted doctrine the logical result
must be that the courts shall retain the power to review legislative and execu-
tive decisions as on a trial de noo, subject of course to any presumptions the
courts wish to employ.
221 Thus the legislature may reasonably prescribe conditions precedent to a
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It is, of course, true that as between executive departments
the legislature may make administrative decisions res judi-
cata22 2 and that to the extent they are correct, or at least to
the extent that a person cannot prove that they are incorrect,
private individuals cannot properly refuse to obey them.2 2 3
It is a fair choice in any case whether the legislature will
select the administrative, the judicial tribunal, or neither in
dealing with the desirability of an official or non-official recog-
nition of rights prior to their enforcement. If the adminis-
trative is chosen some time may be gained in the usual case
because ordinarily administrative proceedings are more expe-
ditious than judicial.
On the other hand in some, if not a good many cases, the
administrative set-up slows up enforcement processes, for in
case of real controversy there must be two trials rather than
one. Suppose, for example, that rate-making for public
utilities, which finally involves the problem of what is a fair
rate, were from the start under the supervision of a judicial
tribunal, would not much time be saved in that field in a great
many instances? A survey of that situation might demon-
strate that the policy of originating those proceedings before
an administrative tribunal is a mistake.
It is believed that nothing stands in the way of creating a
judicial review, or the courts themselves may adopt rules on the subject and,
for example, refuse review until legislative provisions have been exhausted.
They may require the administrative record to be perfect. See, e. g., United
States v.'Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., - U. S. -, 55 S. Ct. 462 (1935). For
a thorough discussion of the cases on the first problem see, note, Administrative
Action As A Pre-Requisite of Judicial Relief, 35 Col. L. Rev. 230 (1935).
222 See, e. g., Silva v. Tillinghast, 36 F. (2d) 801 (D. C. Mass. 1929);
United States v. Great Northern R., 287 U. S. 144 (1932). A failure to pursue
the proper and a timely remedy for judicial correction of the administrative
decision may, of course, make it res judicata as against the parties. See, e. y.,
State Corporation Comm. of Kan. v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U. S. 561 (1934). It
is only res judicata as to matters expressly litigated. See, note, 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 689 (1935).
223 See, e. g., Corn Exchange Bank v. Coler, 280 U. S. 218 (1930). There
was some additional court action here, which, however, was ineffective as such
because of the absence of a necessary party (i. e., the court conceded that the
latter was not bound). The principal proposition seems obvious, and the case
cited holds that there is in it no denial of due process of law.
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special court in place of a good many administrative tribunals.
Congress, for example, has created many legislative courts.
224
The only possible objection would be that the legislative couit
trespasses upon the exclusive jurisdiction granted another
court by the constitution, and that would be but infrequently
a valid objection. As to trial rather than appellate courts
the objection cannot well be sustained, for the jurisdiction of
such special courts is outside the accepted jurisdiction usually
conferred on trial courts by constitutional mandate, and as a
matter of fact business demands have been held to permit the
creation of additional courts. 225  If they had to be called by
a constitutional name nothing is lost.2 26
The most effective illustration of this technic is Compulsory
Arbitration. So far statutes on the subject have been uni-
formly upheld.227  The decision of the arbiters is given the
element of finality by statute. If the arbiters act other than
judicially the statute is at variance with Crowell v. Benson228
and it invades the doctrine of the supremacy of the courts.
But the fair purport of Compulsory Arbitration statutes is
that the parties select for the occasion a special judge whose
decision is res judicata because it is a judgment and not an
administrative order. There is no constitutional reason why
such special courts, created in part by the parties, cannot be
provided for in this field by the legislature. 2 29  They have
concurrent jurisdiction with the existing trial courts but that
of itself is not a conclusive objection. Until the existing trial
224 See supra, n. 210.
225 See supra, n. 193.
226 Usually there is nothing which stands in the way of additional "circuit"
or "district" Courts under the normal constitutional provision on the subject.
227 See, Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263 (1932) ; Berkovitz
v. Arbib, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 238 (1921); note, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 121
(1934) ; Phillips, A Lawyer's Approach to Commercial Arbitration, 44 Yale L.
J. 31 (1934) and articles and cases there cited.
2 2 8Supra, n. 216.
229 The subject of special judges and courts, as has been shown above, is
largely within the power of the legislature. The case of Vitaphone Corp. v.
Electrical Research Products, Inc., 19 Del. Ch. 247, 166 A. 255 (1933) holding
that as a matter of conflict of laws a foreign arbitration statute wa' "'remedy"
not "substance" supports this theory.
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courts have nothing to do it cannot be seriously contended that
the creation of additional courts invades their jurisdiction.
VII
Another corollary of the principal proposition is that the
legislature may not impose upon the courts a non-judicial func-
tion. Thus in the absence of an express constitutional provi-
sion courts cannot be compelled to give advisory opinions on
supposititious cases.23 0  An opinion on a certified question is
really in lieu of an appeal; it deals with the decision of an
actual case, and is therefore a valid procedure.2 3 1
Statutes have frequently imposed upon judges the duty of
making appointments to offices other than judicial. They
have been more or less uniformly upheld,232 although certainly
in substance and policy there is little to sustain them. 233 Courts
have facetiously evaded the difficulty by asserting that the
duty was imposed upon the judge not as judge but upon the
person who happened to be judge at the time. If the
appointee is to perform other than judicial duties as a matter
of good government he ought to be appointed by the execu-
tive. Indeed as between the executive and legislative there is
controlling authority for the proposition that the power of
appointment, in the absence of specific constitutional provision
otherwise, is exclusively an executive function.23 4  Logically
the same result should follow in the principal situation. The
earlier cases here were decided prior to the final acceptance of
the doctrine of the separation of powers and its full purport
230 See 1 C. J. 973, 4. The distinctions between a "moot" case and a pro-
ceeding proper under The Declaratory Judgments Act are pointed out by Pro-
fessor Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1934), 1-61.
231 See 3 C. J. 989-1003.
232 See, 15 R. C. L. 523, 4. By tradition a good many non-judicial acts are
imposed on local courts. See, Nutting, Non-Judicial Functions of the District
Courts in Iowa, 19 Iowa L. Rev. 385 (1934).
233 As indicated by the text cited immediately above there is some very
respectable authority denying the power.
234 Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189 (1928).
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was established and their present significance may well be
questioned.
VIII
Apart from the field of "administrative" law, where both
the legislature and the executive are involved, there are few
clashes between the judiciary and the excutive. The essential
problem again is as to whether or not the doctrine of the
supremacy of the courts applies as against the executive.
Earlier cases, accepting the false analogy of the English sys-
tem, where the courts were agencies of the sovereign and not
a separate and integral part of government, were inclined to
deny jurisdiction in the courts to deal directly against the
executive. 285 Recent decisions have repudiated that position
and it seems now established that the executive is in no more
favorable a position than the legislature. He must decide
correctly, and there is a judicial review of his action on the
merits. 230
Closely akin to that situation is the one involving so-called
"political questions." It has been said that the courts may
not decide them.23 7  The cases it is here asserted are incon-
clusive on the point, and if taken at their face value they con-
stitute one of the few remaining repudiations of the doctrine
of the supremacy of the courts. It is of course true as illus-
trated by those cases that the legislative and the executive
departments in dealing with officers of another or their own
government decide ipso facto whether or not those with whom
they deal are proper officers. It does not follow from that,
however, that the decision is correct. It does seem, however,
that in each of the situations so far presented in the cases that
the decision was correct. 238  If and when a case is presented
235 See, e. g., State ex reL. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243
(1912) and note 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996-1033.
236 See, Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932) and cases there cited.
237 See, e. g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State of Oregon, 223 U. S.
118 (1912) and cases there cited.
288 There was little merit in any of the contentions that the states involved
did not "enjoy" a republican form of government.
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in which the decision by the legislature or executive is obviously
incorrect it remains to be seen whether or not the courts will
evade the question.23 9  Logically if they stick to the doctrine
of the supremacy of the courts they cannot evade it. That is,
assuming for example that Congress and the executive have
the power to decide whether in a given case a state enjoys a
republican form of government (and obviously in the routine
course of events they must decide it) they must still decide
that question correctly. If they decide incorrectly some judi-
cial remedy logically must be available.
One other notable exception to the general doctrine exists.
There is substantial authority for the proposition that the
courts will accept as conclusive recitations in legislative jour-
nals or certificates of legislative officers to the effect that con-
stitutional requirements as to proper legislative procedure
have been followed, and in the absence of an affirmative reci-
tation to the contrary will conclusively presume that the con-
stitution has been followed..2 40  In such instances the legis-
latures and not the courts determine constitutional jurisdic-
tion, and under the guise of a form of words the legislatures
are permitted to violate the constitutions. Again a good
many of those cases were decided before the doctrine of the
supremacy of the courts reached its full strength and their
present acceptability is doubtful.
Ix
As was pointed out at the beginning of this article the spe-
cifically applied law of jurisdiction is found in the law of direct
and collateral attack, in the law of res judicata and the law
of domestic and foreign judgments generally. This is due to
239Part of the basis of those earlier decisions has been repudiated. They
rested in part on the untenable proposition that a judgment which a court
could not enforce could not be rendered. But it has been demonstrated success-
fully that enforcibility of judgments is no pre-requisite of judicial jurisdiction,
although it may be a pertinent inquiry as to the propriety of its exercse. See,
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1934) 9-12.
240 See note 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1. The opposite proposition has been held,
however.
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the underlying assumption that a judgment to be a valid judg-
ment is the utterance of a court having jurisdiction.
It has also been pointed out above that something is to be
gained by dealing with the concept of "existing" jurisdiction
as one problem, and by dealing with the limitations upon its
proper exercise as a distinct problem.
"Existing" judicial jurisdiction may vary according to three
possible standards: 1. Local Law; 2. Constitutional Law;
and 3. Conflict of Laws. The exercise of jurisdiction may be
likewise limited and classified.
The first problem (and the answer in the usual case is
obvious) is this: (a) under the constitution and the statutes
of the state what jurisdiction, so far as this court or this court
system is concerned, has been granted? (b) what limitations
from those sources have been placed upon the exercise of that
jurisdiction? From a purely local point of view a state may
grant or limit judicial jurisdiction and its exercise in any
manner and to any extent it wishes. It is well to emphasize
again that the common law technic here is inapplicable, the
problem is exclusively one of constitutional and statutory
interpretation. Thus the common law analogies may well be
false, for the English system of courts rests on an essentially
different theory.
The second problem is this: (a) what are the permissible
limits of jurisdiction or its exercise under accepted doctrines
of conflict of laws (that is, to what extent will a judgment be
recognized elsewhere, and to what extent will this state rec-
ognize a judgment rendered elsewhere) ? (b) what are the
permissible limits on jurisdiction or its exercise under the
Federal and local constitutions? (On the latter score a state
constitution for example may contain a due process and equal-
ity clause, constituting therefore a general limitation on the
exercise of judicial, legislative or executive jurisdiction.) If
a local situation is involved (a) cannot successfully be raised
directly. But the Fourteenth Amendment and Full Faith and
Credit Clause to all practical purposes have been construed to
impose the conflict of laws standards of accepted international
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judicial jurisdiction upon the states so that the results are the
same whether a local or a conflict of laws situation is con-
cerned.2 41 In the latter situation the result is much the same
whether the conflict of laws standard of jurisdiction, or the
one imposed by the Federal Constitution is asserted. Ulti-
mately; therefore in this country if the constitutional question
be properly presented the standards of local jurisdiction and
its exercise must conform to the standards for so-called inter-
national jurisdiction and its exercise. 242
The application of the concept of an accepted judicial juris-
diction to a specific case is the logical problem of fitting the
case at hand into or out of the jurisdiction granted to the
court in question under those standards. The local limitations
or jurisdiction or its exercise increase the hazards. As has
been pointed out above unfortunately the courts in a great
many instances have regarded legislative limitations and con-
ditions here as conditions precedent to jurisdiction as such,
rather than limitations and conditions as to its exercise, hold-
ing that there must be literal compliance with the limitations
and conditions and that they cannot be waived, nor decided
erroneously.
To start with such an attitude is based upon the mistaken
notion that there is something peculiarly brittle and theologi-
cal about jurisdictional concepts. The idea has been that once
litigants get outside of the accepted bounds of jurisdiction the
results are necessarily absolute zero. It has followed that
judicial action beyond the preconceptions of jurisdiction is void
with a vengeance. This after all is not peculiar to the law
241 That is, an assertion of judicial jurisdiction beyond the proper limits of
jurisdiction is a deprivation of property without due process of law. See
supra, n. 21.
2'42 The question as to whether or not a state must furnish reasonable court
jurisdiction is one which remains somewhat open. It is settled that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Commerce Clause compel state judicial juris-
diction in those situations. It seems clear that due process compels (in the
absence of a reasonable excuse) the same result generally. The author has pre-
sented the cases on this point previously. See, The Commerce Clause of The
United States Constitution (1932), Sec. 41, 105,
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of jurisdiction. When parties get beyond the limits of the law
of torts, contracts and property the result is "no liability."
But indeed in one sense there are no limits there, for "no legal
liability" is as much legal concept and can be as good legal
concept as "legal liability" is. 43 However, and in any event,
in those fields the law has conceded to the parties considerable
power by their conduct to mark the limits to suit the needs
of the situation. Prior to the point where estoppel is opera-
tive the law of torts and property to a large extent are within
the control of the parties. They may contract concerning
their interests in those fields, and finally their interests may
be determined by their conduct quite apart from their con-
sent and the accepted pre-conceptions on the subject. The
point where the desires of the parties and their intentions as
evidenced by their conduct becomes inconclusive is the point
where it is thought that good policy places a limit for fear
that one party has too great an advantage in controlling the
conduct of another because of a superior position, or because
the results will offend the general common good. In general
the parties must get over into the field of "illegality" before
their intentions and wishes are inconclusive and the prelim-
inary pre-conceptions on the subject become unbreakable. In-
deed it is only as a formal proposition that we separate the
law of contracts, quasi-contracts, torts, property, trusts and
estoppel. The substantive law in its entirety includes them
all. The law of contracts, trusts and estoppel may be a sig-
nificant factor in any case, and is as much "law" as the "law"
it supplements. Starting points are seldom proper ending
points in the quest for legal "truth."
And so it is, and ought to be, in the field of jurisdiction.
There is an immense amount of authority for the proposition
that parties may waive, may contract away and may be es-
topped to assert constitutional privileges and limitations. It
has always been true that the law of estoppel has constituted
243 The Hohfeldian philosophy places the emphasis on the inevitable rela-
tional interests arising out of membership in society. Any picture of legal inter-
ests which neglects the human aspect of them is of course necessarily in-
complete.
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a part of the law of judicial jurisdiction.2-' 4  Indeed it is fair
to say that on the whole enlightened courts on this score have
dealt with the law of jurisdiction on the same basis as they
have dealt with substantive law. Constitutional and legisla-
tive utterances in the field of judicial jurisdiction have been
accepted in the light of the law of contracts and estoppel, just
as constitutional and legislative utterances in the field of sub-
stantive law have been accepted as against a similar back-
ground.245
The full significance of that will be discussed later. At this
point the proposition sought to be established is the rather
obvious one that we cannot concede to jurisdictional concepts
any natural or theological content, and that a supposed trans-
gression in the field of jurisdiction, in the light of additional
concepts on the subject, may become insignificant. Jurisdic-
tional concepts should enjoy no peculiar sanctity.
When it comes to a fair interpretation of statutory limita-
tions on the subject of the exercise of judicial jurisdiction it
will be found that most of them are for the benefit of the
adverse party. There is no apparent policy which insists upon
their observance at all odds. They lie rather obviously within
the field of contract and estoppel, and not in the field of "ille-
gality." If the party for whose benefit they have been enacted
does not insist on them there is no occasion for the public
insisting upon them for him or for it. Accepted in that light
a good many restrictions would become immaterial in any
litigated case, and might be immaterial in a default case.
This has usually been the result when dealing with juris-
diction of the person. The pre-conception was that the courts
had jurisdiction over every person physically within the
244 The common law made the sheriff's return conclusive, and one was not
permitted to question the authority of an attorney who had appeared for him.
24. It is indeed impossible to interpret legislative and constitutional utter-
ances apart from common law background. Few general statements in statutes
and constitutions are literally applied because they carry with them the ac-
cepted common law exceptions on the subject.
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state,'2 4' and over those domiciled within the state, or citizens
of it but residing elsewhere. Thus rules as to service of
process and other means of bringing a specific individual be-
fore the court in a given case are rules as to the exercise of
that jurisdiction. They were for the benefit of the party and
could thus be waived. They required in any event a substan-
tial rather than a literal compliance.2 4  Although there was
no distinction made where the point in issue was a lack of
jurisdiction in the international sense. That too could be
waived. The result further was that a violation of the rules
on the subject had to be raised by a plea in abatement thus
giving the adverse party the earliest opportunity to correct
the defect. The presumptions were in favor of a compliance
with the rules.
In the field of jurisdiction of the subject-matter the results
were in reverse. There were no presumptions in favor of its
observance, and the question was not waived by a failure to
raise it.2 48
Just why the common law developed the rule that jurisdic-
tion of the person and venue could be waived, while jurisdic-
tion of the subject-matter could not be waived seems impos-
sible of satisfactory explanation. The most plausible expla-
nation which occurs to the present writer is that jurisdiction
was conceived of in rather brittle terms, as were a good many
other common law concepts. But due to the doctrine of es-
toppel of record jurisdiction of the person unless properly
attacked was established by the record, whereas a lack of
jurisdiction of the subject-matter most often appeared on the
face of the record2 49 and thus was conclusively established
246,"State" is here used as defined in Sec. 2 of the Restatement of Conflict
of Laws, American Law Institute (1934).
247 The latter is immaterial in any case where there was an appearance.
It would only be material in a default case, or in those instances where the
question was properly raised and saved by appropriate procedure.
248 The cases hold that it may be raised for the first time on appeal.
249 That is, if the writ, the pleadings, the verdict and the judgment were
not consistent the matter was settled, regardless as to what the evidence might
have disclosed or have failed to disclose.
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without the point being expressly raised. Thus really the
formalism of the doctrine of estoppel of record and the acci-
dent that jurisdiction of the person depended on matter ex-
traneous to the record brought about the distinction.
Estoppel of record is still accepted doctrine in some cases
but for the most part as against jurisdictional objections it
has been repudiated..250  As pointed out above we would do
well to repudiate it completely.
It is difficult if not impossible to point out any satisfactory
basis for the distinction which provides that jurisdiction of the
person is waved unless raised by a plea in abatement whereas
jurisdiction of the subject-matter is an open question until
after final judgment on appeal (if not longer). A decent sys-
tem of procedure would have the same rule for the latter
which it has provided for the former. Every consideration
of policy demands the settlement of the question of jurisdic-
tion first, and compels the result that if not raised properly it
is waived. Jurisdiction by conduct is as valid a concept as sub-
stantive law by conduct. No persuasive policy is observed
which makes jurisdiction by conduct "illegal." As pointed
obt above constitutional and statutory materials on the subject
can fairly be said to include that background. The short an-
swer to a contrary assertion is that in truth we have an im-
mense amount of authority for jurisdiction by conduct. The
formal difficulties are decreased by construing constitutional
and statutory materials on the subject as being limitations on
the exercise of jurisdiction and not conditions precedent to its
existence.
But in final analysis the difficulties here are surmounted by
the doctrine of the separation of powers and the doctrine of
the supremacy of the courts. Judicial jurisdiction and the
consequence thereof on the legal interests of interested parties
is finally a judicial question. It cannot be decided by the legis-
lature or the executive; it must therefore be decided by the
2Z0 2 Black, Judgments (1891), Sec. 901,
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courts. There is thus imposed on the courts the super-power
of deciding judicial jurisdiction. Thus if the jurisdiction of
another court is called in question in a subsequent proceeding
involving the affect of the first court's action on the interests
of the parties the second court cannot escape a decision on that
question. As it must determine the jurisdiction of the legis-
lature and the executive if properly presented it must deter-
mine the jurisdiction of other courts. Judicial jurisdiction is
a judicial question; courts have power, or jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction. That is a necessary incident of the
doctrine of the separation of powers.
Does the power include the power to determine it as against
or in favor of itself? Does it include the power to determine
it finally although erroneously? In other words does the doc-
trine of res judicata apply to jurisdictional matters? Does a
fair application of the doctrine of the supremacy of the courts
call for an affirmative answer? Under that doctrine the courts
have allocated to themselves the exclusive power to make
mistakes as to substantive rights, and as to executive and
legislative jurisdiction and quite as clearly the doctrine calls
for the application of the same principle to judicial jurisdic-
tion. The sole question is whether the power will be allocated
to the first, second, third or subsequent court.
It has long been accepted doctrine that if a court's own
jurisdiction is properly called in question in the first instance
that it has the duty of deciding the question..3 1  In fact a re-
fusal to decide it is a decision in its favor.2 52
Procedurally the question can be raised in a number of
ways,2- '  and it is said that the court itself must raise the ques-
251 The only case with which the author is familiar which denies this is the
case of State v. Hall, 142 N. C. 710, 55 S. E. 806, (1906). The case was one
where the contention was that there was no court for any purpose. The decision
illustrates the logical difficulties of this general situation once we start with
the assumption that jurisdiction is jurisdiction.
252 This is illustrated by the case cited immediately above. The "court"
tried and sentenced the defendant and therefore held that it was a court.
253 By plea in abatement, demurrer, answer or motion in the trial court.
It may be raised also by writ of prohibition, mandamus and habeas corpus
and sometimes by injunction. Thus there is presented a procedure for a deter-
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tion if the parties do not.254  It has been held that the question
can be raised for the first time on appeal.255  Thus the asser-
tion is commonly made that the question of jurisdiction of the
subject-matter is always open, and is never waived.258  As
applied to that situation, that is, one involving a so-called
direct attack the assertion is correct. Unfortunately it has
been extended to include so-called collateral attack,257 and is
the apparent basis for much of the confusion in that field.
For it seems well established there that the assertion is
incorrect.
There long has been almost unanimous support for the
proposition that a question of jurisdiction squarely presented
to a court of so-called general jurisdiction for decision is
res judicata in a subsequent action. 2 "S This is true even al-
though jurisdiction in the international sense was involved.259
Even although the matter was not expressly raised if the
case was litigated on the supposed merits there is now abun-
dant authority for the proposition that the judgment is res
judicata as to the jurisdictional questions which might have
been presented, even although again they involved jurisdiction
in the international sense.2 60  This has been variously "ex-
mination of the question by a superior court without awaiting a trial and
appeal.
254 See, 15 C. J. 852.
255 Ibid. 849, 50. There certainly is little to sustain this result. Courts have
repeatedly held, for example, that constitutional questions not properly pre-
sented below will not be considered on appeal.
256 See, e. g., 15 C. J. 850.
257 The cases have not always been clear as to the distinction between a
direct and a collateral attack. During the trial, and on appeal, of course, a
question raised as to jurisdictien is a direct attack. Prohibition and mandamus,
because they take the place of appeal, are direct attacks. Equitable proceedings
to vacate or enjoin a default judgment are usually held to be direct attacks.
They may be successfully maintained, of course, for other than jurisdictional
reasons. Other situations constitute collateral attacks.
258 See, Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assoc., 283 U. S. 522
(1931) and cases there cited.
259 This was true in the case cited immediately above.
260 See, e. g., Evers v. Watson, 156 U. S. 527 (1895). See, Harper, The Va-
lidity of Void Divorces, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 158 (1930), where the cases for
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plained." It has been said that the first court is "conclusively
presumed" to have decided the jurisdictional question in its
own favor, or that the parties have "waived" the question, or
that they are "estopped" to raise the question.261
It is still true, apparently, that a default judgment does not
decide jurisdictional questions.2 6 2  Although even there there
is authority for the proposition that jurisdictional questions
may be foreclosed under the doctrine of "estoppel of
record."2 3
Again the analogies of the substantive law feature of the
situation sustain the principal result. It has been established
for some time that as to substantive rights the law of res
judicata foreclosed not only a subsequent inquiry into the in-
terest which was specifically involved and passed upon but
other legal interests which "might have been" presented under
accepted procedure.2 6-' The basis of the doctrine of res
judicata is one of repose. It rests on the policy against reliti-
gation of the same matters and there is good sense in requiring
parties to present all matters as expeditiously as modern pro-
cedure will permit or be foreclosed from a subsequent and
separate litigation of it. On the point of policy involved there
seems to be little controversy. 265
the most part involve jurisdiction of marital status in the international sense.
See also, Sec. 450, 451, Restatement Conflict of Laws, American Law Institute
(1934).
261 In those cases where the facts sustain an actual estoppel there is no
reason why the doctrine should not operate. "Waiver" and "estoppel" here
have been used to explain cases, however, where there was a simple failure
to raise the question.
262 See, e. g., Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 (1924).
There is no indication in any of the recent cases of a departure from this re-
sult. Thus a defendant may default, even although having actual notice of the
proceedings and raise a jurisdictional question in later proceedings. Unless
there is a lack of jurisdiction in the constitutional or international sense this
result is questionable.
2-63 See, e. g., Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236 (1914). In this case it
was held that it was due process of law to enforce a default judgment against
a defendant where the sheriff had made a false return, and therefore where the
defendant had no notice other than by estoppel.
264 The point has been developed in previous articles cited supra, n. 6.
26.M The point in issue has been as to how best to "explain" the results.
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The same reasons after all compel the application of the
same policy and rule to the litigation of jurisdictional mat-
ters.2 6G  If they "might have been" litigated their subsequent
litigation is foreclosed. Once we repudiate the theological
notion that "jurisdiction is jurisdiction" (which in fact was
never true, and which the cases very effectively, if not con-
sistently, repudiate) there are of course no formal or logical
difficulties in the way of the complete acceptance of that
result.
The ultimate point is that any acceptance or definition of
jurisdiction which overlooks the jurisdiction to determine juris-
diction is inaccurate and incomplete. Under the doctrine of
the supremacy of the courts there is by hypothesis included the
power to finally decide it, and thus to decide it erroneously.
There is likewise included the power to impose on the parties
the burden of properly raising the question at the earliest
possible time, or at least prior to judgment, and of imposing
as a penalty for the violation of that rule a foreclosure of the
possibility of presenting it in a collateral proceeding.
One can explain the results here in terms of waiver or es-
toppel or in terms of any other analogous situation.2 6 7  The
present author's objection to those explanations is that they
assume a narrow view of judicial jurisdiction which in final
analysis is at variance with the underlying and accepted con-
cepts on the subject. It is believed that we shall arrive at a
decent result here more quickly by avoiding the confusion
which necessarily arises out of explaining the law of jurisdic-
tion in terms of substantive results.
The problem of specifically applying jurisdiction is one in
200 It is to be noted that the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Sec. 451,
leaves open the question as to whether or not jurisdiction of the subject matter
in the international sense can be "waived." Certainly there is authority to
sustain that result if jurisdiction of the person is concerned, and by analogy,
and due to the fact that many of the cases sustaining jurisdiction in a litigated
case by a conclusive presumption in its favor make no mention of such a dis-
tinction, there is every reason to suppose that a good court will take that
position.
267The explanation i' of course a matter of form; it is the result which
counts.
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which theoretically there is little if any common law leeway.
A given court has been established by a constitution or statute
and its powers are there set out, including the powers incident
to the doctrines of the separation of powers and the supremacy
of the courts. A fair interpretation of the constitution and
the pertinent statutes marks the limits of its powers both as
to persons and subject-matter. As has been suggested above
we would do well to construe most statutory limitations here
to be limitations as to the manner of the exercise of judicial
power rather than conditions precedent to its existence, to
adopt a standard of substantial performance in any event, to
repudiate the present judicial doctrine which distinguishes be-
tween courts of general and courts of special jurisdiction, and
to revise our procedural rules and require all jurisdictional
questions to be raised at the earliest possible moment. A sane
approach to the problem of jurisdictional questions will cer-
tainly minimize the present dangers in that field.
As in the subdivision of jurisdiction of the person local
standards in the subdivision of jurisdiction of the subject-
matter may be inconclusive in the light of constitutional and
conflict of laws requirements. Fitting a specific case into the
jurisdiction of the court in question in the usual case is a simple
matter and the result is obvious. Conceding that the juris-
diction is a permissible or enforced one under constitutional
limitations the problem turns on a fair interpretation of stat-
utory materials on the subject.
x
The author set out to prove nothing. Whether or not lie
has succeeded is debatable. It is hoped that an examination
of the authorities in this field and a re-examination of the com-
monly accepted ideas on the subject will result in some good.
It does seem obvious that a general definition of judicial
power which is accurate will be so general as to be meaning-
less. As against individuals the power is complicated by the
combination of the common law and civil law technics. The
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courts, the legislature and the executive perform similar func-
tions in a great many instances. But finally the most signifi-
cant feature of judicial power, as against individuals and as
against the other departments of government is that arising
out of the doctrine of the supremacy of the courts. The only
really distinctive feature of judicial power is its power to
determine legal interests (including jurisdictional background)
in final form. Without being facetious one can, if he must
attempt a general definition which is significant, define the
judicial power to be the power to make a mistake.
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